By giving the big banks every possible bailout with no concern for cost to taxpayers, Geithner, Summers, and Fed Chairman Bernanke, ignited a firestorm of popular anger – much of which got directed toward Obama – and rightfully so.

Volcker, who was initially appointed as Fed Chairman by President Carter but whose real influence came under Reagan, broke the back of the growing inflation of the 1960’s (that doubled prices in that decade) by raising short-term interest rates to unprecedented levels. This was the opposite of the zero-interest rate policy of Bernanke – and the effects on bank profits was opposite also. In the end, though, Volcker came to be regarded by the financial community as a hero.

Volcker has been a strong critic of letting banks get too big to fail and using that status to take risks that imperial financial stability of the world – with the banks reaping the upside and taxpayer and savers bearing all the downsides.

Let’s hope this is just the first round

Financial Regulation

Bank plan highlight’s Volcker’s new clout

Fri Jan 22, 2010 3:35pm EST

Related News

* Volcker had been outspoken on "too big to fail" concern

* Ex-Fed chief consulting about bank plan with lawmakers

By Caren Bohan

WASHINGTON, Jan 22 (Reuters) – When President Barack Obama launched a fight with Wall Street by announcing a new U.S. plan to limit banks’ size, the man standing at his side was former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker.

Volcker’s new clout on the White House economic team was on full display as the 6-foot-7-inch longtime adviser took the choice spot next to Obama, who named his proposal to restrict bank trading activities "the Volcker Rule."

The 6-foot-1 Obama referred to Volcker as "this tall guy behind me."

U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and senior economic adviser Lawrence Summers — who attended the announcement but at a greater distance from the president — still wield a tremendous amount of power.

Volcker, who commands respect on Wall Street and among both Democrats and Republicans, is seeing a resurgence of his influence after venting frustrations to friends that he had been left out in the cold when it came to economic decision-making at the White House.

The 82-year-old Volcker was one of Obama’s most influential advisers during his 2008 presidential campaign and now chairs a panel of outside economic advisers to the White House.

He had rarely been seen in Washington since the start of the Obama administration and made no secret of a difference in opinion with the White House over how to deal with the problem of "too big to fail" financial firms.

Volcker’s fear, shared by some other economists, is that newly consolidated U.S. banks might engage in reckless behavior on the belief that the government would never allow them to fail because of their sheer size. Such risky activity could put the financial system at risk of another crisis, these economists say.

CLOUT

Asked by the New York Times in October about reports he was losing influence with the Obama White House, Volcker retorted that he "did not have influence to start with."

That made Volcker’s presence at the announcement all the more significant to underscoring Obama’s commitment to push the new regulatory approach that Wall Street appears set to fiercely oppose.

"Volcker being there was huge," said Simon Johnson, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute for Technology and a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.

The bank announcement elated many of Obama’s liberal supporters, who have welcomed his tougher rhetoric in recent weeks toward the banking executives he referred to in December as "fat cats."

Geithner and Summers, who worked together at Treasury during the Clinton administration, have been criticized by some liberal supporters of Obama and view them as too cozy with Wall Street.

Legislation in 1999 tearing down the Depression-era Glass-Steagall law separating commercial and investment banking passed under their watch. Obama’s new bank rules would not bring back Glass-Steagall but would revive its spirit.

Volcker, who has been consulting on Capitol Hill about Obama’s bank proposal, could be an asset to the administration in selling the proposal, said Johnson, who shared Volcker’s frustrations that the administration had not moved earlier to limit the size of banks, which get an implicit subsidy in the form of federal deposit insurance.

"Volcker carries a cache that is unparalleled," said Johnson, noting the former central banker’s role in breaking the back of double-digit inflation in the early 1980s — a victory that came despite a huge popular backlash against the economic pain brought on by his interest-rate increases.

RIFT WITH GEITHNER?

In an indication of a possible rift, financial industry sources told Reuters on Thursday of some reservations Geithner had expressed behind the scenes about the new bank plan, which was not included in the original plan on financial regulatory reform that the administration unveiled last June.

Administration officials, while noting the importance of Volcker’s role, insisted the decision to go forward with the plan was unanimous.

Geithner and Summers worked closely with Volcker late last year on it and had largely finalized it by late December. They put the finishing touches on it on Jan. 13.

Aides said Obama personally felt strongly about moving ahead on curbs on the banks, in part because of concerns about risk-taking by banks after they returned to profitability in the wake of the 2008-2009 financial meltdown.

White House officials played down any talk of Geithner and Summers losing influence.

A trademark of Obama’s management style, which was apparent during the deliberations over his Afghanistan strategy, is to encourage the airing of dissenting views and then to work with his advisers to arrive at a consensus.

"He is concerned to make sure that he’s exposed to all points of view," Summers told a small group of reporters in a briefing last week when asked to describe Obama’s decision-making process. "So he wants to hear disagreement with things that he has said or advisers who have different perspectives to share those differing perspectives."

Also emerging as a bigger player in shaping economic policy is Vice President Joseph Biden, who devoted much of his time last year to helping to oversee the $787 billion stimulus program that Obama signed into law last February.

Biden feels "passionately about the same set of problems" of firms becoming too big to fail and helped to shape the proposal on banks, said one White House official.

(Editing by Howard Goller)

What seems to be continuing its long-term strength is gold. Now, I for one, have always felt that investing in gold is like shooting craps, because gold has no intrinsic value. It is only worth what people are willing to pay at the moment, and this can change for many reasons. I’ve been reading those who are gold bulls for years, and for the most part ignoring their counsel. Now, I’m feeling that gold may be a reasonable place to put some of one’s money. The primary reason for this is that the US and other countries have “printed” so much money (in their efforts to prevent the financial collapse) that the future value of currency relative to gold seems likely to continue to fall (so the price of gold in currency terms will rise).

Aside from this argument, gold has quite steadily risen in the last year (as well as previous years) even when events would argue that it should be declining. This suggests growing underlying demand.

David Rosenberg, who is a great skeptic about equities and the economy, puts the case for gold well:

GOLD GLITTERS

While the gold purchase by India’s central bank is widely viewed as the trigger point for the latest jump in the gold price, there are good reasons why bullion is in bull mode. It comes down to a fiscal policy in the U.S.A. that will stop at nothing to ensure that the economy embarks on an uptrend. Even with a fiscal deficit north of 10% of GDP, the article from yesterday’s WSJ that was titled Job-Creation Panel Leery of Spending really resonated. To wit:

“So far, the White House and Congress have been weighing a range of short-term tax ideas to spur job growth, such as expanded refunds for big companies that suffered losses; extension of a first-time homebuyer tax credit; and a new tax credit for hiring.”

So the strategy remains on “short-term” tactics as opposed to any long-run measures to improve the capital stock, enhance skills and training, bolster education and enhance productivity growth. If Milton Friedman taught us anything from the permanent income hypothesis, it was that changes to income or wealth that are perceived to be permanent have a much more beneficial and enduring effect than measures that are only transitory. But of course the other problem is who will pay for this fiscal largesse, and the answer is that nobody —the Fed will simply monetize the debt. More dollars will be printed and that is bullish for gold whose production is in secular decline.

Then we saw this article on the WSJ yesterday too, titled Labor Gets Boost In Skies, on Rails. Anyone involved in the markets, has to read this article and understand the differences between what is happening now and when the secular bull market began under Reagan administration in the early 1980s. To wit:

“Organized labor appears to be gaining the upper hand in the skies and on the rails, as labor and business battle for influence under the Obama administration.

Another reason for our bullish stance on gold is that we are not seeing the onset of a secular bull market in equities like the one we saw in the early 1980s.

The National Mediation Board wants to make it easier for thousands of airline and railway workers to unionize under the Railway Labor Act by seeking to junk a 75-year old election rule, according to a proposal published Monday in the Federal register. The move comes after a White House appointment shifted the balance of the government agency’s three-person board. Linda Puchala, a former flight attendant union leader, was selected to replace Read Van de Water, a former Northwest Airlines lobbyist, earlier this year.”

To reiterate, this is not the onset of a sustainable secular bull market in equities as we had coming off the fundamental lows of prior bear phases, such as August 1982, when:

• Dividend yields were 6%, not sub 2% currently
• Price-to-earnings multiples were 8x, not 26x
• The market traded at book value, not over two times book
• Inflation and bond yields were in double digits and headed down in the future, not near-zero and only headed higher
• The stock market competed with 18% cash rates, not zero, and as such had a much higher hurdle to clear
• Sentiment was universally bearish; hardly the case today
• Global trade flows were in the process of accelerating as barriers were taken down; today, we are seeing trade flows recede as frictions, disputes and tariffs become the order of the day
• Unionization rates were on a secular decline; today labor power is clearly on the rise
• A Reagan-led movement was afoot to reduce the role of government with attendant productivity gains in the future; as opposed to the infiltration by the public sector into the capital markets, union sector, economy and of course, the realm of CEO compensation

FINAL WORD ON GOLD

Gold broke out to a new high yesterday of $1,084/oz (and continues to rally today). It did this despite the S&P 500 managing to tick up two points and despite the DXY index actually eking out an 8bps rise to 76.3. This is NOT just a U.S. dollar story — have a look at what bullion is doing in Euro terms. Very impressive. This is a broadly based breakout and that means a durable secular bull market.
Looking at the growth rates in fiat currency that central banks are creating to stimulate their economies and the amount of bullion that would be necessary to back up this massive global monetary infusion suggests that gold can at least double if not triple from here. If you missed the first 4x runup from the $250/oz lows a decade ago, don’t worry about it. It’s like worrying about how you would have missed the first half of the rally in the S&P 500 from 1982 to 1992 when the index was at 400 and still had 300% to go before finally peaking out and sputtering at the 1500+ highs eight years later. In other words, the cup is still half full — and still can be filled with gold eagle coins.

Another investment source, Prieur du Plessis, who I respect, makes the case for gold from another perspective:

Gold bullion surging in all currencies

I argued the bull case for gold in my posts over the past few months (see “Gold bullion – regaining its shine?“, “Gold bullion glitters bright” and “Gold bullion – challenging $1,000“. With the gold price scaling fresh peaks and closing in on $1,100, it would certainly seem as if renewed interest in the yellow metal is being stirred up, especially subsequent to the purchase by India’s central bank of 200 metric tons of gold from the International Monetary Fund.

As printing presses are running at full speed to produce ever-increasing quantities of fiat money as governments engineer the greatest asset price reflation in human history – and the US greenback is heading South – the longer-term fundamental case for the yellow metal is arguably positive.

“The gold bug has caught several big hedge fund managers this year including John Paulson of Paulson & Company, Kyle Bass of Hayman Advisors and David Einhorn of Greenlight Capital, who believe enormous monetary and fiscal stimulus that has been injected into the global economy will eventually result in hyperinflation,” said The New York Times.

The gold price is not only making headway in US dollar terms, but also in most major (and minor) currencies as illustrated by the table and graph below. This is a manifestation of increased investment demand, whereas the initial rise in the gold price from its low in 2001 ($250) was mostly a reflection of US dollar weakness.

…

The shorter-term technical picture is also looking interesting. This is explained by Adam Hewison of INO.com who prepared a short technical analysis of gold’s most likely direction and key chart levels. Click here to access the video presentation.

Seasonally, the period from November to December has traditional been good for gold, with average gains ranging from more than 1% to almost 2.5% since 1970.

Source: Plexus Asset Management

I remain bullish on gold in the medium term, especially as I believe the vast money printing by central banks could set off strong inflation pressures down the road. I will not be surprised to see bullion remaining in a secular uptrend in the medium term. Add bullion to your portfolios, but given the notorious volatility of the metal only do so on pullbacks. (Emphasis added.)

Full Article

I stress the last sentence in Mr. Plessis’s article, because even thought the trend is strongly upward, there is a lot of volatility in price. Buying now, after such a sharp rise entails the risk of a fall. On the other hand, gold fever seems to be spreading quite broadly, which could lead to near-term sharp rises.

The simplest way to invest in gold is the buy GLD through a stock broker. This is an exchange traded fund that holds physical gold equal to the value of the outstanding shares; so it is relatively secure, and it is very actively traded.

A final warning: my timing has been less than sterling in the last year; so my coming to feel gold is a reasonable investment (among a set of relatively bleak choices) could be a good contrary sign.

I followed this doubleheader program with the following interview with Simon Johnson, who I previously recommended here, and U.S. Representative March Kaptur, who totally captured my heart. It was a perfect complement to the first program, making it all too clear why the ghetto dwellers are left to rot when not thrown in prison. If the bankers care not at all about those whites in middle America who are suffering while they fatten up on the public purse, what possibility is there that we will truly address the failure of our society/economy to provide a meaningful life for the black and brown of the ghettos?

I haven’t posted anything on the financial crisis for quite some time, because the main flows have not changed since March or April 2009, when the Obama Administration made abundantly clear they were going to continue to turn the firehose of public money onto the banking sector until big firms were flush with cash and profit. The flow continues and the banks are now flush – while the rest of the economy is in the sh__house.

The anatomy of this scandal is laid out in depressing detail in Barry Ritholz’s book, Bailout Nation.  He also today posted the Moyer interview with Johnson and Kaptur in convenient format, including the transcript.

The interview ends with this exchange. If nothing else, you should watch the end of the interview so that you can see the expression on Johnson’s face as he says, “I’m skeptical.” The expression leaves no doubt of the depth of his skepticism.

MARCY KAPTUR: I don’t think President Obama has the right people around him. The poor man inherited a total mess, globally and domestically. I think some of the people that he trusted haven’t delivered. I urge him to get new generals. It’s time.

SIMON JOHNSON: Louis the Fourteenth of France, a very powerful monarch, was famous for having many bad things, you know, happen under his rule. And people would always say, ‘If only Louis the Fourteenth knew. I’m sure he doesn’t know. If we could just tell him, he’d sort it out.’ You know. I’m skeptical.

Kaptur & Johnson on Bill Moyers

By Barry Ritholtz – October 11th, 2009, 8:57AM

Just over a year after economic calamity brought promises of reform from Washington, has Wall Street really changed? Former International Monetary Fund chief economist Simon Johnson and US Rep. Marcy Kaptur (D-OH) report on the state of the economy.

click for video

In Michael Moore’s new film Capitalism: A Love Story, Congresswoman Kaptur says there has been a financial coup d’etat, and that Wall Street – rather than Congress – is in charge.

October 9, 2009

BILL MOYERS: Welcome to the JOURNAL.

I sat in a theater packed with passionate moviegoers, every one of them seemingly aghast at the Wall Street skullduggery exposed by Michael Moore in his latest film. It’s called ‘Capitalism: A Love Story.’ Here’s an excerpt:

MICHAEL MOORE: We’re here to get the money back for the American People. Do you think it’s too harsh to call what has happened here a coup d’état? A financial coup d’état?

MARCY KAPTUR: That’s, no. Because I think that’s what’s happened. Um, a financial coup d’état?

MICHAEL MOORE: Yeah.

MARCY KAPTUR: I could agree with that. I could agree with that. Because the people here really aren’t in charge. Wall Street is in charge.

BILL MOYERS: That’s the progressive Representative from Ohio, Marcy Kaptur, she’s with me now. She has a Masters from the University of Michigan, did graduate study at M.I.T. and still lives in the same house in the Toledo working class neighborhood where she grew up.

She’s in her 14th term in Congress, the longest-serving Democratic woman in the history of the House, and she’s an outspoken financial watchdog on three important Committees: Appropriations, Budget and Oversight and Government Reform.

Also with me is a familiar face to viewers of this broadcast. Simon Johnson is the former Chief Economist at the International Monetary Fund. He now teaches Global Economics and Management at M.I.T.’s Sloan School of Management. He’s one of the founders of the website Baselinescenario.com. I check it out daily for Simon’s take on the economic and financial crisis.

It’s been a year since the great collapse and both my guests are well equipped to assess what’s happened since then. Welcome to you both.

MARCY KAPTUR: Thank you.

BILL MOYERS: Let’s look at this story that I just read from the Associated Press this week about how Treasury Secretary Geithner is on the phone several times a day with a select group of very powerful Wall Street bankers, especially Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, Goldman Sachs. He will talk to them when Members of Congress have to leave a message on the answering machine. And these are the bankers who helped bring on this calamity and who are now benefiting from it. What does that say to you?

MARCY KAPTUR: That says to me that Wall Street and Washington is a circuit. And because Mr.Geithner headed the New York Fed that that historic relationship, unfortunately, continues. And it gives them special access and special power to influence policy.

SIMON JOHNSON: Well, I think it really tells you how the system works. The system is based on access and is based on what on Wall Street shaping Washington’s view of what’s important.

It’s the people who are very close to Mr. Geithner before when he was the head of the New York Fed. Before he became Treasury Secretary. These people have unparalleled access. And in a crisis, when everything is up for grabs, you don’t know what’s going on, the people who will take your phone calls, right, in government and people who are going to be standing in the oval office, making the key decisions. That’s the heart of the system. That’s the heart of how you get your agenda through, by changing their worldview.

MARCY KAPTUR: And they also move people. In other words, Mr. Geithner came from the New York Fed, he came from Wall Street, and he becomes Secretary of the Treasury. His predecessor, Mr. Paulson, came from Goldman Sachs, and he becomes Secretary of Treasury. You can go back decades, and you will see that there’s this revolving door between Wall Street and Washington. And I recently asked Chairman Bernanke of the Federal Reserve, ‘Let me ask you a question. Would you be willing to consider a reform where the Cleveland Fed would have equal power to the New York Fed, in terms of how the Fed is run?’ And his answer was, ‘No.’

BILL MOYERS: And why did you ask that question?

MARCY KAPTUR: Because I think we need to democratize the Fed. I think that my region of the country, which is suffering so heavily from these decisions that were made by Wall Street and Washington, we need to have voice. And our bankers, who didn’t do the bad things, our community bankers, who are having to pay higher fees shouldn’t be treated this way. Why should the people who did it right be penalized for those that did it wrong?

SIMON JOHNSON: Remember Wall Street convinced us that trading derivatives without any regulation, that all these kind of crazy housing loans, which are very dangerous for consumers. That all of this was sensible. All of this was a good way to sustain growth. That was wrong. That wasn’t it. That wasn’t that’s not the end of the story. In the crisis, when things got bad, they also convinced the key people in Washington that they, the bankers, the big bankers, the Wall Street bankers, who are really responsible for all of these problems, they should be saved. Not just their banks, but they individually and should be saved. Their jobs, their pensions, all their perks. It’s an extraordinary moment.

BILL MOYERS: You asked on your blog, just this week, a question I want to put to you now, and to both of you. You asked, ‘Does this crisis reflect something about the disproportionate influence of a few incompetent investment bankers or a deeper breakdown of capitalism?” What’s your answer to your own question?

SIMON JOHNSON: Well, definitely, this disproportionate influence of some fairly incompetent bankers, that’s for sure. That’s what we’re seeing today. That’s what we’ve seen over the past few months. I think on the issue on the issue of capitalism, we have to take this very seriously. To me, at least, the financial part of our capitalism is very seriously broken.

SIMON JOHNSON: They persuaded us to allow them to take incredible risks. And then they pushed all the downside, all those losses onto us, the taxpayer, at the same time as really hammering hard all the people who were duped, essentially, into taking out loans. People lost their houses. It’s an absolute tragedy. This combination cannot go on. And yet, the opportunity for real reform has already passed. And there is not going to be not only is there not going to be change, but I’ll go further. I’ll say it’s going to be worse, what comes out of this, in terms of the financial system, its power, and what it can get away with.

BILL MOYERS: Why?

SIMON JOHNSON: That’s the.

BILL MOYERS: Why is it going to how is it going to be worse?

SIMON JOHNSON: Well, there’s four we used to have a dozen or so substantial big banks, now we’re down to four. Now we’re down to four big banks that have a lot more market power and a lot more political power. They make the campaign contributions. They shape agendas in ways that are that are really quite scary. If you look, for example, at derivatives. And the debate on whether or not derivatives should be regulated in a sensible manner. And at this point, actually, the Obama Administration has is leaning in a better direction. But the big financial players are absolutely against any kind of sensible regulation. And I think they’re going to win.

MARCY KAPTUR: Let me give you a reality from ground zero in Toledo, Ohio. Our foreclosures have gone up 94 percent. A few months ago, I met with our realtors. And I said, ‘What should I know?’ They said, ‘Well, first of all, you should know the worst companies that are doing this to us.’

MARCY KAPTUR: I said, ‘Well, give me the top one.’ They said, ‘J.P. Morgan Chase.’ I went back to Washington that night. And one of my colleagues said, ‘You want to come to dinner?’ I said, ‘Well, what is it?’ He said, ‘Well, it’s a meeting with Jamie Dimon, the head of J.P. Morgan Chase.’ I said, ‘Wow, yes. I really do.’ So, I go to this meeting in a fancy hotel, fancy dinner, and everyone is complimenting him. I mean, it was just like a love fest.

MARCY KAPTUR: They finally got to me, and my point to ask a question. I said, ‘Well, I don’t want to speak out of turn here, Mr. Dimon.’ I said, ‘But your company is the largest forecloser in my district. And our Realtors just said to me this morning that your people don’t return phone calls.’ I said, ‘We can’t do work outs.’ And he looked at me, he said, ‘Do you know that I talk to your Governor all the time?’ He said, ‘Our company employs 10,000 people in Ohio.’

MARCY KAPTUR: And I’m thinking, ‘What is that? A threat?’ And he said, ‘I speak to the Mayor of Columbus.’ I said, ‘Why don’t you come further north?’ I said, ‘Toledo, Cleveland, where the foreclosures are just skyrocketing.’ He said, ‘Well, we’ll have someone call you.’ And he gave me a card. And they never did. For two weeks, we tried to reach them. And finally, I was on a national news show. And I told this story. They called within ten minutes. And they said, ‘Oh, we’ll work with you. We’ll try to do some workouts in your area.’

We planned the first one after working with them for weeks and weeks and weeks. Their people never showed up. And it was a Friday. Our people had taken off work. They’d driven from all these locations to come. We kept calling J.P. Morgan Chase saying, ‘Where’s your person? Where’s your person?’ And they finally sent somebody down from Detroit by 3:00 in the afternoon. But out people had been waiting all morning and a lot of people that’s how they treat our people.

BILL MOYERS: You did a remarkable thing on the floor of the House recently. And I want to show my audience a clip of a speech in which you urge people to break the law.

MARCY KAPTUR: So why should any American citizen be kicked out of their homes in this cold weather? In Ohio it is going to be 10 or 20 below zero. Don’t leave your home. Because you know what? When those companies say they have your mortgage, unless you have a lawyer that can put his or her finger on that mortgage, you don’t have that mortgage, and you are going to find they can’t find the paper up there on Wall Street. So I say to the American people, you be squatters in your own homes. Don’t you leave. In Ohio and Michigan and Indiana and Illinois and all these other places our people are being treated like chattel, and this Congress is stymied.

BILL MOYERS: Wow. You are urging them to resist the law when the Sheriff shows up to throw them out of their home.

MARCY KAPTUR: I’m saying that they deserve justice, too. And that the scales of justice in front of the Supreme Court are supposed to be balanced, and they’re not. And that possession is 90 percent of the law. And that you have legal rights, as a home owner. You have a right to legal representation. You have a right before the judge to have the mortgage note produced by whomever in the system has it. Judge Boyko of Cleveland threw out six cases, because when the foreclosures came up, the financial institutions couldn’t produce the note. Our people deserve their day in court.

BILL MOYERS: What’s your explanation as an economist. And a student of this financial system as to why the banks are taking so long to help the homeowners when Congress has allocated funds for that purpose?

SIMON JOHNSON: I’m afraid that it’s pretty obvious and it’s very tragic. That they have no interest in helping the homeowners. They make money with what they’re doing. Bill, they’ll expected a lot of these mortgages they made to default, okay? It was in their models. A high default rate. Now, they didn’t expect house prices to come down so much. That’s where they got their losses. But they absolutely made these loans expecting they would have to foreclose on people. And figuring they would make money on that.

SIMON JOHNSON: These are very smart, very profit-oriented people. I can assure you, if there was money in it for them. They would be negotiating you know, very various kinds of re-schedulings of these loans. They don’t want to do it. They it’s not in their interest. It’s not where the money is. Follow the money. The money is where Jamie Dimon says it is. Jamie Dimon says, ‘You ain’t seen nothing yet,’ in terms of his lobby in Washington. He’s on the record as saying, he’s this is his big initiative right now.

BILL MOYERS: To?

SIMON JOHNSON: To spend more time in Washington, more time cultivating all those relationships on Capital Hill and in the executive branch. And you know what else Jamie Dimon said to his shareholders? To his shareholders meeting this year, he said, with regard to 2008, the year of what we regard as the greatest financial crisis, an absolute human tragedy. He said, Jamie Dimon said to his shareholders, ‘This was perhaps our best year ever.’

MARCY KAPTUR: Think about what these banks have done. They have taken very imprudent behavior, irresponsible. They have really gambled, all right? And in many cases, been involved in fraudulent activity. And then when they lost, they shifted their losses to the taxpayer. So, if you look at an instrumentality like the F.H.A., the Federal Housing Administration. They used to insure one of every 50 mortgages in the country. Now it’s one out of four.

MARCY KAPTUR: Because what they’re doing is they’re taking their mistakes and they’re dumping them on the taxpayer. So, you and I, and the long term debt of our country and our children and grandchildren. It’s all at risk because of their behavior. We aren’t reigning them in. The laws of Congress passed last year in terms of housing, were hollow. Were hollow.

MARCY KAPTUR: Foreclosures in my area have gone up 94 percent. And we know the basic rules of economics. Housing leads us to recovery. Housing was the precipitating factor in this economic downturn. Unless you dealing with the housing sector, you aren’t going to have growth in this economy

BILL MOYERS: You’re both saying the financial world, the banks in particular, are putting their interests above anybody else’s interest. And they’ve got the power in the executive branch, and the Congress to back up their demands, right?

SIMON JOHNSON: This is capitalism, Bill. That’s what they’re supposed to do. They represent their shareholders, they’re appointed by the board of directors to make money for their shareholders. And the way they think that they can best make money is to shape the regulatory rules around housing around derivatives, around all everything we used to have that kept the financial sector under control. Has all been, you know, washed away, one way or another, by their efforts, right? They make money in the boom, that way. And when and when bad things happen, they shove all the downside onto the taxpayer. That’s what they’re doing their job.

MARCY KAPTUR: It’s socialism for the big banks. Because they’ve basically taken their mistakes and they’ve put it on the taxpayer. That’s the government. That’s socialism. That isn’t capitalism.

SIMON JOHNSON: Well people some people call that lemon socialism. So, when it turns out to be a lemon, it’s you it’s yours, the taxpayer. When it turns out to be good, it’s mine, I’m Wall Street.

BILL MOYERS: Why have we not had the reform that we all knew was being was needed and being demanded a year ago?

SIMON JOHNSON: I think the opportunity the short term opportunity was missed. There was an opportunity that the Obama Administration had. President Obama campaigned on a message of change. I voted for him. I supported him. And I believed in this message. And I thought that the time for change, for the financial sector, was absolutely upon us. This was abundantly apparent by the inauguration in January of this year.

SIMON JOHNSON: And Rahm Emanuel, the President’s Chief of Staff has a saying. He’s widely known for saying, ‘Never let a good crisis go to waste’. Well, the crisis is over, Bill. The crisis in the financial sector, not for people who own homes, but the crisis for the big banks is substantially over. And it was completely wasted. The Administration refused to break the power of the big banks, when they had the opportunity, earlier this year. And the regulatory reforms they are now pursuing will turn out to be, in my opinion, and I do follow this day to day, you know. These reforms will turn out to be essentially meaningless.

MARCY KAPTUR: When Lincoln ran into trouble, during the Civil War, he got new generals. He brought in Grant. I hope that President Obama will bring in some new generals on the financial front.

BILL MOYERS: Should Geithner be fired? And Summers be fired?

MARCY KAPTUR: I don’t think that any individuals who had their hands on creating this mess should be in charge of cleaning it up. I honestly don’t think they’re capable of it.

BILL MOYERS: Let me show you an excerpt from the speech President Obama made on Wall Street last month, September. Here is the challenge he laid down to the bankers.

PRESIDENT OBAMA: We will not go back to the days of reckless behavior and unchecked excess at the heart of this crisis, where too many were motivated only by the appetite for quick kills and bloated bonuses. Those on Wall Street cannot resume taking risks without regard for consequences, and expect that next time, American taxpayers will be there to break their fall.

BILL MOYERS: A reality check. Not one CEO of a Wall Street bank was there to hear the President. What do you make of that?

SIMON JOHNSON: Arrogance. Because they have no fear for the government anymore. They have no respect for the President, which I find absolutely extraordinary and shocking. All right? And I think they have no not an ounce of gratitude to the American people, who saved them, their jobs, and the way they run the world.

BILL MOYERS: In the scheme of things, it is the Congress, and the government that’s supposed to stand up to the powerful, organized interests, for the people in Toledo, who can’t come to Washington. Who are working or trying to keep their homes or trying to pay their health bills. What’s happened to our government?

MARCY KAPTUR: Congress has really shut down. I’m disappointed in both chambers, because wouldn’t you think, with the largest financial crisis in American history, in the largest transfer of wealth from the American people to the biggest banks in this country, that every committee of Congress would be involved in hearings, that this would be on the news, that people would be engaged in this. What we’re seeing is– tangential hearings on very arcane aspects of financial reform. For example, now we’re going to have a consumer protection agency to help the poor consumer, who doesn’t understand all of this, rather than hearings on the fundamental new architecture of reforming the American financial system, so that we have prudent lending, capital accumulation at the local level again; that we encourage savings and limit debt by the American people. Our country needs this. Those aren’t the hearings that are happening.

If you want a marker at the Federal level of how serious we are to get justice out of this financial crisis, look at the F.B.I. Look at the number of people who are really prosecuting and investigation mortgage fraud and securities fraud. It is so small

I’ve been one of the Members of Congress trying to increase by ten times the agents to get at the justice issues for the American people. For companies that have been hurt. For shareholders that have been hurt. Our government isn’t doing it. That it’s very easy to look at the budget of the F.B.I. in mortgage fraud and securities fraud and say, ‘How serious is the government?’ And until those numbers increase, we will not begin to get justice.

BILL MOYERS: If we can’t get reform out of this calamity, when can we get it then, given the realities you have both described?

SIMON JOHNSON: That’s the worry, Bill, right? And I’m very serious. I’m very serious about this. Which is, you know, does it take- we have elements of the Great Depression now, in terms of the impact on people, okay? I mean, people losing their jobs, their homes, their health insurance.

BILL MOYERS: Even though Wall Street says, ‘Well, we’re past the crisis now. Profits at the banks are up. And Wall Street- and the stock market is stirring.’

SIMON JOHNSON: We’re out of the financial part of the crisis, we’re not out of the human part of the crisis.

MARCY KAPTUR: And we’re not out of the housing crisis. The President ought to take these empty units and require his Administration to broker rental agreements with families, so they’re not kicked out. Property values are dropping, all over the country, sometimes by as much as 25 percent. You can do a 30 year mortgage, even a 40 year mortgage, where people have a job or even unemployment benefits, if they’re going to get them for another year. Well, my goodness, you can keep them in their home. Empty units do no one any good.

Let me tell you what happened in- where I live in Toledo, Ohio. The house next to me was foreclosed. And so, I called, the other day, a little plaque appeared on the door of this house. And it said, ‘$500 down, $300 a month rent.’ I said, ‘What is that, a land contract deal? What’s going on there?’ So I called the number. I get a repossession dealer in South Carolina. I said, ‘Hello sir, what’s your name?’ ‘Johnny,’ or something. I said, ‘And what’s your address?’ He gave me a P.O. Box number. I said, ‘Now listen,’ I said, ‘Your property is bringing down the value of our property because you’re on our heels.’ ‘Lady, I get these things from the bank.’ And he said, ‘You know, we try to unload ‘em. What are you going to offer me?’ This is what he’s saying to me over the telephone. I don’t think a single one of my neighbors knows that that home is now in possession of a group in South Carolina that could care less about it.

SIMON JOHNSON: Just to reinforce this point. Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac are now government agencies. Okay? They not only hold a lot of mortgages that are in default or close to default. They’re also responsible for enormous amount of the new loans- that are being originated anywhere in the country, actually. They work for the President. The kinds of proposals that Congresswoman Kaptur’s put in forth are entirely reasonable. And can be implemented by the executive branch, hopefully with Congress on board, certainly at the urging of certain members of Congress, obviously. But they can do it.

BILL MOYERS: So Simon, go ahead- you were saying- what is it that scares you? You’re worried?

SIMON JOHNSON: Another Great Depression. Right? If you don’t fix the financial system, Bill. If you allow them to have the same attitude. If you- if you actually allow them to increase their economic power, their ability to take risk, and their belief that they can shove the losses onto the government. And that’s why they didn’t show up to President Obama’s speech on Wall Street.

BILL MOYERS: Why don’t they respect him?

SIMON JOHNSON: Because they think that the next time they won’t even have to ask. They’ll just be given the bailout that they want.

MARCY KAPTUR: Right. That’s been their history. Their bed is feathered. When they messed up during the 1980s, they put their bill through the savings and loans crisis on the American people. $140 billion.

BILL MOYERS: And we’re still paying that off, by the way. I think the last payment will be made in 2013.

MARCY KAPTUR: Very good. Most people don’t even know that.

BILL MOYERS: Well, I covered that.

MARCY KAPTUR: But that, you know, it opened the flood gates. They go, ‘Oh, we can get away with $140 billion?’ This time how many trillions have they gotten away with? Plus all the deregulatory actions that were taken during the 1990s. I remember when they came to the Congress, when Newt Gingrich became Speaker of the House. And they came down to the Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee, and they took the name off the door. And they changed it to Financial Services. And people began to see that they had money in the bank, and they charged them a fee to cash their own check on their own money. And then fees went up for everything. And the ordinary consumer found, ‘Hey, it’s not so smart to have a savings account, because it costs me more money if I have under $10,000 in the bank, they charge me all this money on my own money.’ They got exactly what they wanted. And so, then all the abuses and the irresponsible and imprudent behavior of the 1990s that led to this, nobody did anything. They just kept opening more floodgates to them. And then with the removal of Glass-Steagall in 1999, which I-

BILL MOYERS: That was the rule that kept the investment banks from being owned by banks, right?

MARCY KAPTUR: It’s about separating banking and commerce.

BILL MOYERS: Right.

MARCY KAPTUR: They said as a country, you know, banks have extraordinary power. They have the power to create money. And decide how much that is worth. They have extraordinary power. And we used to have capital ratios. We need to get back to them. Ten to one. For every dollar in your bank, you can lend ten. You know what J.P. Morgan did? A hundred to one. And then with derivatives, who knows how much? Glass-Steagall separated banking from commerce, so that we didn’t have these institutions getting too big, getting into too many things. And we just gave them total abandon. And they took it.

SIMON JOHNSON: Well, the final end of the last vestige of Glass-Steagall came in just now in August. Unnoted, but I think very significant. Goldman Sachs, you remember, was an investment bank, a securities company. Not allowed to be a commercial bank; didn’t have access to the Federal Reserve and this ability to tap into the money supply of the country. Until September of last year, when the crisis broke, they were allowed a very short notice to convert to being a bank holding company. This was what saved Goldman Sachs in my opinion. Also Morgan Stanley. Which meant they could stay in the securities business. And they could also have access to the Federal Reserve. In August, just now, they converted to what’s called a financial holding company. That may seem like a technical detail to you, but this means they can borrow from the Fed, at essentially zero interest rate now.

They can invest in, I mean, as far as we can see, from the outside, looking at their portfolio, anything they want, including, you’re going to love this one, they just bought some stock, big chunk of stock in a Chinese automotive company. Okay? So, that’s your money, that’s your Federal Reserve, financing a highly speculative investment. And if it goes well, they get the upside. And if it goes badly, that’s another one for us.

BILL MOYERS: Well, and this is what we were talking about earlier, the system. I mean, President Clinton’s Secretary of Treasury, Robert Rubin helps eliminate Glass-Steagall. And then leaves the government and goes to work for? Citicorp?

SIMON JOHNSON: Well Rubin’s a fascinating character. He ran Goldman Sachs, he went into the Clinton White House, then he became Secretary of the Treasury, and it was on his watch that, first of all, Glass-Steagall began to really seriously crumble, and then it was completely swept away- replaced, abolished, really. And then, of course, Rubin goes on after he leaves Treasury, to be the senior guru type figure at Citigroup. And Citigroup is absolutely epicenter of everything that’s gone wrong with our financial system.

BILL MOYERS: And wasn’t it Robert Rubin the mentor, the guru to both Tim Geithner and Larry Summers?

SIMON JOHNSON: Absolutely. Both Geithner and Summers advanced to senior positions in the Treasury under Rubin was instrumental in bringing Larry Summers to be President of Harvard, after the Clinton Administration. And according to published new report, he was absolutely key person in making sure that Tim Geithner first went to a senior job at the IMF, and then became President of the New York Fed. And there are unconfirmed reports that Robert Rubin was an essential advisor to then candidate Obama in fall of last year, with regard to who he should bring on board as the leadership team on the economic side.

MARCY KAPTUR: And you know, looking at it from the heartland, when I look at Wall Street and all their connections into Washington, and I’ve been at it a while now, it’s very disheartening to me, because I know they don’t care about us out there. We’re flyover country for them. And they’re just out to make money.

And I have seen people that I worked with in the Carter White House, who were associated what the bond industry of Wall Street, use their access and create for themselves a money path that today has led them to head organizations like Black Rock, and get private contracts with the Federal Reserve. The over $2 trillion, we don’t know how much that the Federal Reserve has extended at this point.

BILL MOYERS: And Black Rock is?

MARCY KAPTUR: Black Rock is an institution that has gotten the major contract of the Federal Reserve to do the mortgage workouts. And my question is, the very people involved in Black Rock, who’ve gotten these confidential contracts with the Federal Reserve, they were involved on Wall Street in creating the instruments in the first place. So how do we know that they are not covering up their own crime?

BILL MOYERS: So, Simon, what happens now? If we’re going to avert a depression and the next calamity, what needs to be done?

SIMON JOHNSON: Well, I think you have to keep at it, Bill. I mean, that’s the lesson from previous generations of Americans, who have really confronted entrenched power like this. You have to keep at it. And you mustn’t be satisfied. When the Administration says, ‘Okay, we fixed it. Don’t worry. We did some technical tweaking on capital requirements, for example, in the banks.’ You have to say, ‘No, that’s not true. Let’s look at what’s happening, let’s follow it through.’

The muckrakers of today are absolutely essential, I think, to really pushing these banks. And revealing what they’re doing. And by the way, Bill, it’s going to I think it’s going to be a long haul. I think that the economy will start to recover. We’ll get some jobs back. It’s going to be very painful for a lot of people. But other people’s attention is going to drift. It’s a three, five, seven, maybe twelve year cycle. But when it comes back, it will come back with a vengeance. And it will be even, I think, even more devastating, in all likelihood, than what we just saw.

BILL MOYERS: How do we get Congress back? How do we get Congress to do what it’s supposed to do? Oversight. Real reform. Challenge the powers that be.

MARCY KAPTUR: We have to take the money out. We have to get rid of the constant fundraising that happens inside the Congress. Before political parties used to raise money; now individual members are raising money through the DCCC and the RCCC. It is absolutely corrupt. It’s good people.

BILL MOYERS: Those are the fundraising groups both parties-

MARCY KAPTUR: Parties.

BILL MOYERS: In the Congress.

MARCY KAPTUR: And then people wonder, ‘Well, why doesn’t Congress get along?’ Because they are made into arch enemies by the type of fundraising system that is embedded in the very guts of the institution. So, you’ve got to clean that out. But meanwhile, we need to get hired over at the justice department, 1,000 agents, in mortgage fraud and in securities fraud. Then, I pray, that the leadership of both chambers will do the kind of robust hearings that the nation deserves to rout out those who did wrong and to change the fundamental financial architecture of this country. And then the President needs to get his top housing advisors in the room with him. And they need to meet all weekend. And they need to get their arms around this housing market, in order to stem the rising foreclosures. We haven’t stopped the bleeding out there.

BILL MOYERS: Does President Obama get it?

MARCY KAPTUR: I don’t think President Obama has the right people around him. The poor man inherited a total mess, globally and domestically. I think some of the people that he trusted haven’t delivered. I urge him to get new generals. It’s time.

SIMON JOHNSON: Louis the Fourteenth of France, a very powerful monarch, was famous for having many bad things, you know, happen under his rule. And people would always say, ‘If only Louis the Fourteenth knew. I’m sure he doesn’t know. If we could just tell him, he’d sort it out.’ You know. I’m skeptical.

BILL MOYERS: Simon Johnson, Congresswoman Kaptur, thank you both very much for this interesting discussion.

MARCY KAPTUR: Thank you.

SIMON JOHNSON: Thank you.

Faithful readers will have noted that I have posted nothing about the market or economy for quite some time. The reason is that I’ve concluded that the sources that I’ve been reproducing here have not been helpful for those seeking investment help. I have little new to share, because the situation is the same as when I last posted: the economy continues to look sickly, with little prospect for near-term growth; the stock market continues it euphoric response to slowing declines in output and earnings that are not down as much as the average analyst predicted. Those who have been swayed by my postings have missed a very substantial rally in the market. I’m sorry.

What does seem clear is that the policy makers of the world averted the Armageddon that seemed a real possibility last fall. The Federal Reserve and Obama, in March of this year, also made it abundantly clear that they would pour trillions into the financial institutions that caused the meltdown in order keep them from bankruptcy. Too Big To Fail seems to be the new mantra of the government managers. The recognition that banks were going to be bailed out ignited the rally that continues to this day.

There is no shortage of intelligent commentators who think the rally is built on fragile, brittle foundations that will soon collapse. For sure, the market seems unjustifiably exuberant. I keep asking myself why this should be. As I said once before when asking when the rally will end, the only explanation that makes any sense is that the vast amounts of money pumped into the financial system is leading to a new round of asset inflation. In the case of stocks, the very low interest rates on low-risk, government bonds and money market funds and CDs are a strong incentive to look for higher returns in the stock market.

How long this “illusion” can continue is anyone’s guess. At some point, though, sales and earnings need to expand (not simply contract less slowly), and expand sharply, or the low paying but low risk government bonds are going to begin to look more attractive than stocks of companies mired in low profits. How long will market leaders be willing to wait. Again, I have no idea.

Here’s an article that captures the conundrum well, starting out with a warning of doom from a seer who has been very good in the past, and then following it with a contrary view. Place your bets!

RBS uber-bear issues fresh alert on global stock markets

Three-month slide could hit record lows, Royal Bank of Scotland chief credit strategist Bob Janjuah predicts.

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, International Business Editor
Published: 8:26PM BST 12 Aug 2009

 

A bear market is being forecast for after the summer Photo: REUTERS

Britain’s Uber-bear is growling again. After predicting a torrid "relief rally" over the early summer, Bob Janjuah at Royal Bank of Scotland is advising clients to take profits in global equity and commodity markets and prepare for another storm as winter nears.

"We are now in the middle of a parabolic spike up," he said in his latest confidential note to clients.

"I expect this risk rally to continue into – and maybe through – a large part of August. What happens after that? The next ugly leg of the bear market begins as we get into the July through September ‘tipping zone’, driven by the failure of the data to validate the V (shaped recovery) that is now fully priced into markets."

The key indicators to watch are business spending on equipment (Capex), incomes, jobs, and profits. Only a "surge higher" in these gauges can justify current asset prices. Results that are merely "less bad" will not suffice.

He expects global stock markets to test their March lows, and probably worse. The slide could last three months. "A move to new lows is highly likely," he said.

Mr Janjuah, RBS’s chief credit strategist, has a loyal following in the City. He was one of the very few analysts to speak out early about the dangerous excesses of the credit bubble. He then made waves in the summer of 2008 by issuing a global crash alert, giving warning that a "very nasty period is soon to be upon us" as – indeed it was. Lehman Brothers and AIG imploded weeks later.

This time he expects the S&P 500 index of US equities to reach the "mid 500s", almost halving from current levels near 1000. Such a fall would take London’s FTSE 100 to around 2,500. The iTraxx Crossover index measuring spreads on low-grade European debt will double to 1250.

Mr Janjuah advises investors to seek safety in 10-year German bonds in late August or early September.

While media headlines have played up the short-term bounce of corporate earnings, Mr Janjuah said this is a statistical illusion. Profits were in reality down 20pc in the second quarter from the year before. They cannot rise much as the West slowly purges debt and adjusts to record over-capacity. "Investors are again being sucked back into the game where ‘markets make opinions’, where ‘excess liquidity’ is the driving investment rationale.

"The last two Augusts proved to be pivotal turning points: August 2007 being the proverbial ‘head-fake’ when everyone wanted to believe that policy-makers had seen off the credit disaster at the pass, and August 2008 being the calm before the utter collapse of Sept/Oct/Nov… 3rd time lucky anyone?"

The elephant in the room is the spiralling public debt as private losses are shifted on to the taxpayer, especially in Britain and America. "Ask yourself this: who bails out Government after they have bailed out everyone?"

Mr Janjuah said governments might put off the day of reckoning into the middle of next year if they resort to another shot of stimulus, but that would store yet further problems. "If what I fear plays out then I will have to concede that the lunatics who ran the asylum pretty much into the ground last year are back in control."

Over at Morgan Stanley, equity guru Teun Draaisma thinks we are through the worst. "We were on course for a Great Depression in February, but Armageddon was avoided. Governments did not repeat the policy errors of the 1930s."

"We have seen the lows of this crisis. This is a genuine rebound rally, and it has been short by historical standards so far," he said.

Mr Draaisma, who called the top of the bull market almost to the day in mid-2007, has crunched the worldwide data on 19 major stock market crashes over the last century. They show that the typical rebound rally (as opposed to bear trap rallies, when markets later plunge to new lows) lasts 17 months and stocks rise 71pc. The 1993 rally in the US was 170pc over 13 months. Finland’s rally in 1994 was 295pc. Hong Kong rallied 159pc in 2000. This rebound is only five months old. The key indexes have risen 49pc in the US and 42pc in Europe. Mr Draaisma advises clients to stay in the stocks for now, but stick to telecom companies, utilities, and oil.

Yet he too expects a nasty correction once this rally falters. The usual trigger at this stage of the cycle is when central bankers start to make hawkish noises, typically a couple of months before the first turn of the screw (normally a rate rise, but in this case an end to "quantitative easing". "As long as policy-makers are talking about how fragile the recovery is, equities are unlikely to go down much."

This moment can be hard to judge. There has already been rumbling from some governors at the US Federal Reserve and from the European Central Bank’s Jean-Claude Trichet. Markets are pricing in rates rises by early next year.

The pattern after major financial bust-ups is that the rebound rally gives way to another fall of 25pc or so, lasting a year, followed by five years of hard slog as stocks bounce up and down in a trading range, going nowhere. Mr Draaisma suggests taking a close look at the chart of Japan’s Nikkei index from 1991 to 1999. Gains were zero.

We are in uncharted waters, however. Monetary and fiscal stimulus has been unprecedented. Russell Napier at Hong Kong brokers CLSA says a powerful bull market is already taking shape as the American giant reawakens. Perma-bears will be left behind. He said: "It is dangerous to be in cash."

When the finest minds in the business disagree so starkly, the rest of us can only shake our heads in confusion.

Now, some of the competitors are revealing the details because they feel they are being unfairly excluded because of inside deals between Goldman Sachs and the exchanges. I myself have watched limit orders for a stock change instantaneously after a single sale – not just one order, but a whole host of orders. I realized that all of these orders had to be controlled by computers. Now the full story is emerging. It is fascinating, amazing, highly technical, and full of high finance shenanigans to the major benefit of a few favored firms – notably Goldman Sachs.

What really caught my eye was that the NYSE pays firms, again, notably, Goldman Sachs, 1/4 cent per share to “supply liquidity” for providing limit orders (which be posted a fraction of a second before being executed, because the computer program sees the profit potential and acts on it). On a million shares, 1/4 cent per share amounts to $2500. Repeat this a thousand times for a billion shares, and you get $2,500,000 –- about one week or Goldman Sach’s recent program trading. But this doesn’t tell the whole story. Because Goldman Sachs is in a privileged position to know the order flows and execute trades, 87.5% of their trades make money! Generally, only a penny a share, but the pennies mount up – and they are in effect a transaction tax paid by you.

Below are some links to some further sources on this story, but first is a good summary of the situation by John Mauldin. It has a link at the end where, if you are properly outraged, will take you to where you can complain directly to the SEC. Understanding this is going to require some concentration (even I can’t follow it all), but the effort will be rewarded.

This Is Outrageous

But first, I want to direct the attention of those in the US finance industry to a white paper written by Themis Trading, called "Toxic Equity Trading Order Flow on Wall Street." Basically, they outline why volume and volatility have jumped so much since 2007; and it’s not due to the credit crisis. They estimate that 70% of the volume in today’s markets is from high-frequency program trading. They outline how large brokers and funds can buy and sell a stock for the same price and still make 0.5 cents. Do that a million times a day and the money adds up. Or maybe do it 8 billion times. It requires powerful computers, complicity of the exchanges (because the exchanges get paid a lot), and highly proximate computer connections. Literally, the need for speed is so important that to play this game you have to have your servers physically at the exchange. Across the river in New Jersey is too slow. Forget Texas or California. This is a game played out in microseconds.

The retail world doesn’t get to play. This is a game only for big boys who can afford to pay for the "arms" needed to fight this war. But the rest of us pay for the game, as that half cent is like a tax on transactions, not to mention the increased daily volatility, which skews pricing. Think it doesn’t affect you? That "tax" is paid by mutual funds, your pension fund, and every large institution.

Frankly, this is outrageous. The more I read the madder I got. And it is going to get worse as computers get faster and software more intelligent. We need rules to level the playing field. Themis suggests one simple one: just make it a rule that all bids have to be good for at least one second. That would cure a lot of problems. One lousy second! In a world of microseconds, that is an eternity.

Goldman Sachs went after an employee who stole some of their latest and greatest software this last week. The US assistant attorney general said in the courtroom that the software had the potential to manipulate the market. Imagine that. I am shocked. There is gambling going on in the back room? Gee, commissioner, I had no idea.

All this "algo" (algorithmic) trading also gives a very false impression of volume. If you are a fund and see 10 million shares a day traded, you might feel comfortable that you could hold one million shares and exit your trade easily. But if 80% of the volume is false "algo" trading, that volume isn’t really there. You may have a position that will be a problem if you want to exit, and not know it.

"High-frequency trading strategies have become a stealth tax on retail and institutional investors. While stock prices will probably go where they would have gone anyway, toxic trading takes money from real investors and gives it to the high frequency trader who has the best computer. The exchanges, ECNs and high frequency traders are slowly bleeding investors, causing their transaction costs to rise, and the investors don’t even know it." (Themis Trading)

We are literally talking billions of dollars here. The SEC needs to step in and stop this, and soon. This is a lot more important than the salaries of investment professionals, for which the Obama administration today suggested new rules, which would allow the SEC to oversee salaries at member firms. Seriously? They don’t have enough to do already?

The link to the white paper is http://www.themistrading.com/article_files/0000/0348/Toxic_Equity_Trading_on_Wall_Street_12-17-08.pdf. Themis Trading is at http://www.themistrading.com/.

Read the paper. Then, if you like, drop the very nice folks at the SEC your thoughts at tradingandmarkets@sec.gov.

More on this story, with links to many sources, are contained in a recent Casey Report, reprinted by the Big Picture.

The inner connections and political influence of Goldman Sachs seems like a story that is going to keep on growing – or at least should. It is a quintessential example of the huge public costs of the mega-finance that our country and most of the world has come to depend on to fuel the endless economic growth deemed essential for well being. The costs go well beyond the profits of the free-wheeling casino firms that dominate the financial world. Far more important are their political connections, which skew public policies to their benefit and to the detriment of the public.

There is absolutely no one in the inner circle of Obama’s economic advisors who doesn’t believe fully in that the current financial/corporate, free market economy. There is no one within the administration to tell Obama of the pressing need for fundamental changes in the management and operation of our economy and in the political economy of power. Even Paul Volcker, who is no radical thinker, has apparently been pushed to the sidelines.

When you add to Bernanke to Summers and Geithner, you have a trio seemingly hell-bent on transferring whatever the required amount of wealth from savers and taxpayers to the financial institutions to reinflate them to the bloated size they were before the meltdown. The biggest banks are being made whole while the rest of us are living with our wealth reduced by one-third to one-half, or more for many unlucky enough to buy and mortgage houses at the top of the bubble.

When I read a number of news items last week, my sense of discouragement grew. The biggest investment banks, led by Goldman Sachs, the biggest, baddest, and most successful, are upping bonuses, ramping up speculation, and using all of their political clout (which is massive) to water down the gentle regulatory reforms proposed by Obama.

As a hopeful investor, I was particularly struck by news that Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse had both mightily expanded their “program trading” activities. Program trading is minute by minute trading in massive quantities, using computers and sophisticated programs to profit from discrepancies in the pricing of securities – and also to profit from inside information and from their abilities to move the market. The numbers are staggering. In the week ended June 19, 2009, 40 percent of all trades on the NY Stock Exchange were program trades. This was an increase from 30 percent the prior week. As Zero Hedge said in reporting these numbers:

Virtually every broker saw their Principal PT operations double week over week: seems like everyone is brokering those ETF trades now. Poor SPY and IWM [popular ETFs] are being mangled 10 ways from Sunday nowadays.

The absolute numbers are equally staggering. Goldman Sachs’ program trades were almost a billion shares in the week, and Credit Suisse’s were half a billion.

With this amount of domination in the market by the investment banks, it makes me wonder what are the odds against me in the market?

The resurgence of the investment banks is not just in the US, but in Europe, too – where governments are equally dedicated to bailing them out. Reuter columnist Paul Taylor wrote on June 24, 2009:

No sooner has the financial system begun to stabilize than Big Finance is reverting to its old ways — aggressive hiring, remuneration on steroids, wriggling out of regulation or threatening to decamp to evade tougher supervision.

These are is not the rantings of some crypto-Marxist City-basher, but the considered view of one of Europe’s most thoughtful financial regulators.

Today’s Der Spiegel has a lengthy article, “A Real Free Lunch” detailing the extent of the transfer of wealth to investment banks in Germany, and their use of the low-interest loans from the central bank to make safe, profitable investments and speculations, rather than to loan to businesses – the ostensible, public justification for the bank bailouts.

The extent to which speculation appears to be driving the markets is indicated by how closely all asset classes –stocks, currencies, and commodities – have been moving together. I’ve noted that there is an almost perfect correlation between the price of the Australian dollar and the S&P 500! This seem completely bizarre.

In the chart below, the blue line is the S&P 500 index. The weekly ups and downs tracked very closely, though the change in the Australian dollar was generally more muted.

The close correlation in prices has been widely noted, and taken by some as a warning sign. A recent article in Bloomberg spelled out:

Cash Best as Record Correlation Hints Herd Collapse (Update3)

By Eric Martin and Michael Tsang

June 29 (Bloomberg) — Investors are moving in lockstep like never before, driving up stocks, commodities and emerging markets and risking a replay of last year, when they all plunged the most since World War II.

The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index, whose increase in the past three months was the steepest in seven decades, is rallying in tandem with benchmark measures for raw materials, developing- country equities and hedge funds. The so-called correlation coefficient that measures how closely markets rise and fall together has reached the highest levels ever, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

…

The gains [in all markets’ pushed correlations between the indexes to 0.74 this month, based on percentage changes over the past 60 days. That’s the highest in at least five decades, data compiled by Bloomberg show. A reading of 1 means two assets move in tandem, while zero means no relationship.

The correlation never rose above 0.66 before this month.

Gains in U.S. stocks have mirrored those in crude oil as never before, with correlations above 0.7 this month, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

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David Rosenberg, of Gluskin Schiff, a Canadian economist whose insights I respect, pointed out the correlation and warned of its implications:

June 4, 2009
Everyone is back in the same trade

• Buy stocks (massive multiple expansion – S&P 500 priced for $75 operating EPS)
• Buy commodities (still long-term bullish but a pullback is definitely overdue)
• Buy non-Treasury bonds (same story as commodities – long-term bullish on corporates, but supply is now coming in droves and being gobbled up – this is NOT the contrarian trade of six-months ago)
• Buy gold (again, in a secular bull phase, but the dollar is not going to zero and being bearish on the greenback has become far too fashionable – especially in the wake of Bill Gross’s latest missive; the Euro is saddled with problems at least as deep as the USD, if not deeper)
• And of course, sell Treasuries (that was a good trade coming off the 2% lows on the 10-year note, but what we just saw crammed into six months, which took 48 months to accomplish in the last bear market in govie bonds, was yields soaring 175bps from the low). Sentiment on government bonds is exceedingly bearish and inflation views have become too extreme for my liking. I believe there is a lack of appreciation from what history tells us about the aftershocks that occur after a cycle that was dominated by a credit collapse and asset deflation, as opposed to a garden-variety inventory-led recession. In five words: economic fragility, lingering deflation pressure.

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What we are seeing is the re-creation of a finance-dominated economy, with the hedge funds and investment banks using easy money to play with our futures. This is not a pretty picture, and it is not one that seems likely to get any better. The central banks, which are creatures of the banks, are calling the tune around the world. Most politicians, even if not in the pay of the banks, appear to see no alternative for “saving the economy” to pumping up credit through the banking system.

I have more reasons for being discouraged, but I’ll save those for another day.

If we were to continue the path of the Great Depression, real economic activity would have still a lot further to fall, and the stock market, though it has fallen a lot this time, would still have another 50% decline to go. Still, if the Great Depression is a guide, the stock market now is well below the level it was at the same relative point in time.

To me, the real question that these charts raise relates to the effectiveness of the fiscal and monetary measures that have been taken this time. Here are some comparison charts:

Clearly, short-term interest rates were lower initially and have since been pushed down to unprecedented levels.

The money supply, which is another indicator of monetary policy, is shown starting 4 years before the downturn (unlike the prior charts):

The authors comment on this chart:

Figure 5 shows money supply for a GDP-weighted average of 19 countries accounting for more than half of world GDP in 2004. Clearly, monetary expansion was more rapid in the run-up to the 2008 crisis than during 1925-29, which is a reminder that the stage-setting events were not the same in the two cases. Moreover, the global money supply continued to grow rapidly in 2008, unlike in 1929 when it levelled off and then underwent a catastrophic decline.

Fiscal policy, as represented by government surpluses or deficits, is shown again starting 4 years before the downturn.

While monetary policy is wildly different than following 1929, fiscal policy is much less radically different. If we look at year 5 (2009), the fiscal deficit is about 2% of GDP. In 1930, it was zero; but 2% of GDP is not very significant. In 2010, the deficit is projected to be much larger, over 5%, compared to still zero in 1931.

The burning question is whether these differences are enough to push the world economy onto a different, more positive path than occurred in the 1930’s. There are certainly skeptics, especially followers of the Austrian school of economics. The current prevailing view, though, is that these measures, plus more that will be tried if these seem inadequate, will succeed. This seems overly sanguine to me. Rather, I think it is best to view us as in the midst of a grand economic experiment on the largest scale ever tried. Experiments, by their very nature, have uncertain outcomes.

We have already seen one part of the policy armada begin to come apart: the pushing down of long-term interest rates in order to make mortgages cheaper and house purchases more affordable. In the last month, the market has turned sour on US Treasuries. Yields on ten-year Treasuries have risen remarkably this year. The yield on the benchmark 10-year Treasury due May 2019 ended last week at 3.83 percent, up from the low this year of 2.14 percent on Jan. 15 (Bloomberg). Rising long term Treasury yields have pushed up mortgage rates from a low of 4.75% just a little over a month ago to a current 5.45%.

The rise in Treasury yields is being attributed to the massive deficits (the flip side of the economic stimulus). The federal government is going to need to sell $2 trillion of bonds to cover the deficit. There is skepticism in the market that this amount will be saleable at current yields, especially given the concern that all of the monetary measure will lead to inflation. Clearly, not everything is under the control of central government policy makers.

The article itself is not all that insightful, but what caught my eye was a reference to Robert Shiller, and following that reference did lead me to useful insights. You may recall that Robert Shiller is most widely cited because of the Case-Shiller index of housing prices, an index that captures current housing prices much better than the government index. Shiller is also justly recognized for being an early, persistent alarmist about the housing bubble and the likelihood that when it burst it would do serious economic damage. He did not foresee the magnitude of the calamity, but he shouldn’t be criticized for what no one really foresaw.

To me, what stands out is that Shiller is a full-fledged establishment economist, a full professor at economics and finance at Yale University. As far as I can tell, just about every establishment economist is completely at a loss when it comes to understanding the real economy, that is, the economy that matters to those of us who need jobs, food on the table, the ability to pay for health care, to educate our children, and hopefully, eventually to retire. Establishment economists live in a world of ever expanding production (measured by GDP, which includes all the negatives as positives), where any and all problems are overcome by further increases in production. In this world, stock prices, housing prices, and commodity prices are just not all that important, because they don’t relate to what they consider real, that is real, that is, inflation-adjusted GDP.

Now, of course there is the legion of mathematical economists who migrated wholesale to the big financial firms over the last 20-30 years, but they have had no interest in the real economy either, only in how to use mathematics and statistics to more accurately price assets (ignoring the contradiction between this task and the belief in the theory of efficient markets). There is no doubt that some of this work led to outsize profits for them and their employees, but most of these profits came not from truly better valuations but from using huge amounts of credit to multiply their ability to profit from small imperfections in the market. Hardly any of them saw further than the next bonus check.

Robert Shiller is evidently cut from different cloth. He first published Irrational Exuberance in early 2000, before the dot-com bubble burst. He published the second edition in 2006, warning of the unjustified housing bubble.

Not only did he address the general public, but he tried to warn policy makers – although he explains his timidity in doing this in a New York Times article of November 1, 2008, “Challenging the Crowd in Whispers, Not Shouts". In this article, Dr. Shiller gives his view of why everyone, including himself, is reluctant to object too loudly to a widely held consensus view. He cites his experience with the housing bubble.

For example, I clearly remember a taxi driver in Miami explaining to me years ago that the housing bubble there was getting crazy. With all the construction under way, which he pointed out as we drove along, he said that there would surely be a glut in the market and, eventually, a disaster.

But why weren’t the experts at the Fed saying such things? And why didn’t a consensus of economists at universities and other institutions warn that a crisis was on the way?

The field of social psychology provides a possible answer. In his classic 1972 book, “Groupthink,” Irving L. Janis, the Yale psychologist, explained how panels of experts could make colossal mistakes. People on these panels, he said, are forever worrying about their personal relevance and effectiveness, and feel that if they deviate too far from the consensus, they will not be given a serious role. They self-censor personal doubts about the emerging group consensus if they cannot express these doubts in a formal way that conforms with apparent assumptions held by the group.

…

From my own experience on expert panels, I know firsthand the pressures that people — might I say mavericks? — may feel when questioning the group consensus.

I was connected with the Federal Reserve System as a member the economic advisory panel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York from 1990 until 2004, when the New York bank’s new president, Timothy F. Geithner, arrived. [Note that this was published on November 1, 2008, before the election and before Geithner became Treasury Secretary. Interesting that Shiller left the panel when Geithner arrived. Roylat] That panel advises the president of the New York bank, who, in turn, is vice chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, which sets interest rates. In my position on the panel, I felt the need to use restraint. While I warned about the bubbles I believed were developing in the stock and housing markets, I did so very gently, and felt vulnerable expressing such quirky views. Deviating too far from consensus leaves one feeling potentially ostracized from the group, with the risk that one may be terminated.

…

I gave talks in 2005 at both the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in which I argued that we were in the middle of a dangerous housing bubble. I urged these mortgage regulators to impose suitability requirements on mortgage lenders, to assure that the loans were appropriate for the people taking them.

The reaction to this suggestion was roughly this: yes, some staff members had expressed such concerns, and yes, officials knew about the possibility that there was a bubble, but they weren’t taking any of us seriously.

…

I based my predictions largely on the recently developed field of behavioral economics, which posits that psychology matters for economic events. Behavioral economists are still regarded as a fringe group by many mainstream economists. Support from fellow behavioral economists was important in my daring to talk about speculative bubbles. [Emphasis added. Roylat]

Two aspects of this article stand out: 1) Incorporating social psychology into an understanding of the failure of the market and its overseers to see what should have been obvious, and 2) the fact that there is a field of “behavioral economics.” It seems well worthwhile to learn more about this field of economics – and I’m starting out by getting a copy of Irrational Exuberance . This could prove to be a basic foundation for understanding the waves of over-optimism (and over-pessimism) that sweep over markets with regularity.

What is Going On?

I’ve been expecting the end of the stock market rally for quite a while, but nothing has been capable of changing the upward trend. Technical signals that it is “overbought” (meaning it has gone up too far, too fast compared to historical norms) and fundamental analysis showing it is “overvalued” relative to historical norms seem to have no effect on the market. Marc Faber has been calling for a correction for several months and says he has “taken some money off the table” and shorted the S&P to hedge his long positions in Asian stocks. Still the market keeps going up. What is going on?

My own view is that the desperate efforts of the central banks around the world to counteract the financial implosion have pushed so much money into the financial system that they’ve recreated another liquidity bubble – too much cash and credit looking for a home. Just as the previous credit bubble caused massive inflation in values of real assets such as houses, commodities, land, and stocks, the current money inflation by the Federal Reserve and other central banks has been”successful” in restoring the conditions for asset-inflation. The market seems to be being driven by the same dynamic that caused the peak in stock prices and commodities in 2007 – but this time absent the underlying expansion of the real economy that provided some plausible rationale for the inflating prices. This time, we seem to be in a pure speculation binge.

I confess that I have been unable to resist following some of the crowd into investments in commodities and betting against the dollar by buying foreign currencies. These have been profitable at a rate that makes no sense, and so I am more fearful than ever of a sharp reversal – and am poised to run.

David Rosenberg, Chief Economist for Gluskin Sheff and Associates summarizes the situation succinctly. His point is that when everyone climbs into the same trades, at some point there is no one left outside to keep them moving upward. When they begin to fall and people begin to jump ship, the dynamic can quickly swing the other way. What is keeping it afloat now seems to be the excessive liquidity pumped into the system and the now conventional idea that inflation will be the big next economic event. I have emphasized his caution about this view.

Market & Data Musings
Brunch with Dave

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June 4, 2009
Everyone is back in the same trade

• Buy stocks (massive multiple expansion – S&P 500 priced for $75 operating EPS)
• Buy commodities (still long-term bullish but a pullback is definitely overdue)
• Buy non-Treasury bonds (same story as commodities – long-term bullish on corporates, but supply is now coming in droves and being gobbled up – this is NOT the contrarian trade of six-months ago)
• Buy gold (again, in a secular bull phase, but the dollar is not going to zero and being bearish on the greenback has become far too fashionable – especially in the wake of Bill Gross’s latest missive; the Euro is saddled with problems at least as deep as the USD, if not deeper)
• And of course, sell Treasuries (that was a good trade coming off the 2% lows on the 10-year note, but what we just saw crammed into six months, which took 48 months to accomplish in the last bear market in govie bonds, was yields soaring 175bps from the low). Sentiment on government bonds is exceedingly bearish and inflation views have become too extreme for my liking. I believe there is a lack of appreciation from what history tells us about the aftershocks that occur after a cycle that was dominated by a credit collapse and asset deflation, as opposed to a garden-variety inventory-led recession. In five words: economic fragility, lingering deflation pressure.

You may access the full text of the Research Report by clicking on the link above.

Martin Wolf, a columnist for the Financial Times, writes about the costs to Britain of its politically dominant financial sector. All that he says is applicable to our country. Read it and weep.

Why Britain has to curb finance

By Martin Wolf

Published: May 21 2009 19:44 | Last updated: May 21 2009 19:44

The UK has a strategic nightmare: it has a strong comparative advantage in the world’s most irresponsible industry. So now, in the wake of the biggest financial crisis since the 1930s, the UK must ask itself a painful question: how should the country manage the cuckoo sitting in its nest?

The question is inescapable. London is one of the world’s two most important centres of global finance. Its regulators have, as a result, an influence on the world economy out of proportion to the country’s size. In the years leading up to the crisis, that influence was surely malign: the “light touch” approach led the way in a regulatory race to the bottom.

EDITOR’S CHOICE

Martin Wolf: This crisis is a moment, but may not be a defining one – May-19

Martin Wolf: Why Obama’s conservatism may not prove good enough – May-12

The fiscal costs of this crisis will be comparable to those of a big war. Thursday’s threatened downgrade by Standard & Poor’s is a reminder of those costs. Loss of jobs and incomes will also scar the lives of hundreds of millions of people around the world.

All this occurred, in part, because institutions replete with highly qualified and highly rewarded people were unable or unwilling to manage risk responsibly. The UK, as a country, the City of London and the broader financial industry bear much responsibility for this calamity. This is a time for self-examination.

A recent report on the future of UK international financial services, produced by a group co-chaired by Sir Win Bischoff, former chairman of Citigroup, and Alistair Darling, chancellor of the exchequer, fails to provide such self-examination. This is partly because the committee consisted of the industry’s “great and good”. It is far more because Mr Darling had already decided that “financial services are critical to the UK’s future”. Thus, the report’s remit was “to examine the competitiveness of financial services globally and to develop a framework on which to base policy and initiatives to keep UK financial services competitive”.

If you ask the wrong question, you will get the wrong answer. The right question is, instead, this: what framework is needed to ensure that the operation of the financial sector is compatible with the long-run health of the UK and world economies?

Quite simply, the sector imposes massive negative externalities (or costs) on bystanders. Thus, the recommendation “that the financial sector be allowed to recalibrate its activities according to the sentiments and demands of the market” is wrong. A market works well if, and only if, decision-makers confront the consequences of their decisions. This is not – and probably cannot be – the case in finance: certainly, people now sit on fortunes earned in activities that have led to unprecedented rescues and the worst recession since the 1930s. Given this, the industry has become too big. If implicit and explicit guarantees and externalities, including volatility, were fully charged, the sector would surely shrink.

So how should one manage a sector that produces such “bads”? The answer is: in the same way as any polluting activity. One taxes it. At this point, the authors of the report will surely ask: “How can you suggest taxing a sector so vital to the UK economy?” The answer is: easily. Financial services generate only 8 per cent of gross domestic product. They are more important for taxation and the balance of payments. But this tax revenue turns out to be perilously volatile. True, in 2007, the last year before the crisis, the UK ran a trade surplus of £37bn in financial services, partially offsetting an £89bn deficit in goods. But smaller net earnings from financial services would have generated a lower real exchange rate and more earnings elsewhere. Given the costs imposed by the financial sector, a more diversified economy would have been healthier. Such sacrilegious ideas are, of course, not to be found in the Bischoff report.

How then should the UK approach policy towards the sector? I would suggest the following guiding ideas.

First, the UK needs to make global regulation work. It should discourage regulatory arbitrage even if it expects to gain in the short run.

Second, it must, in particular, help ensure that owners and managers of financial institutions internalise most of the costs of their actions.

Third, it must reject egregious special pleading from the industry. The sector argues that moving derivatives trading on to exchanges might damage innovation. So what? Maximising innovation is a crazy objective. As in pharmaceuticals, a trade-off exists between innovation and safety. If institutions threaten to take trading activities offshore, banking licenses should be revoked.

Fourth, while trying to create a stable and favourable environment for business activities, the UK should try to diversify the economy away from finance, not reinforce its overly strong comparative advantage within it.

Fifth, UK authorities need to ensure that the risks run by institutions they guarantee fall within the financial and regulatory capacity of the British state. They should not let the country be exposed to the risks created by inadequately supported and under-regulated foreign institutions. At the very least, they should not undermine other governments’ efforts to regulate their own institutions.

The “old normal” was simply unsustainable. The “new normal” must be very different. It is far from clear that the industry and government recognise this grim truth.

Write to martin.wolf@ft.com
More columns at www.ft.com/martinwolf

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009